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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we highlight a number of problems 
arising with a commonly used supplier selection method: the 
weighted factor score method. We discuss the behaviour of this 
method with respect to weighting, scaling issues, and relative scoring. 
Assuming that there is no convex dominance, we formally prove that 
with the same supplier selection method, we can make any supplier 
win by judiciously choosing the right parameters of the awarding 
mechanism. This means that any supplier can win if certain 
parameters are not published in a request for a proposal. This result 
applies to both absolute and relative scoring methods. Also, we prove 
that the buyer should fully disclose all details of the awarding 
mechanism to suppliers in order to receive better bids. The practical 
implications of our results are far reaching for procurement, both 
public and otherwise: full transparency and disclosure of all details 
regarding weights and awarding schemes is not only required to 
avoid subjectivity in supplier selection, but it also leads to better bids 
from suppliers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Supplier selection has attracted quite some attention from academics. 
Possible reasons for this are its perceived importance, its visibility (at 
least in the sense that the ultimate outcome is identifiable), and its 
suitability for formal, mathematical modelling. Many academic 
papers describe various formal decision methods, decision elements, 
supplier behaviour in tendering, and quantitative and qualitative 
decision criteria for supplier selection (e.g., Albano et al., 2008; De 
Boer et al., 1998, 2001; De Boer and Van der Wegen 2003; Choi and 
Hartley, 1996; Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997; Narasimhan, 1983; 
Weber and Current, 1993).  
In addition to this academic attention, both governments and legal 
experts have paid quite some attention to supplier selection. For 
instance, the European Union (EU) directives state that to enhance 
transparency, objectivity, and non-discrimination, tendering 
organisations should publish (1) the decision criteria and (2) their 
relative importance (if applicable) in a Request for a Proposal (RfP).  
Despite this amount of attention from academia, public policy 
makers, and practitioners, the practical use of formal decision 
methods is not without problems and is susceptible to misuse. This 
can be explained by the fact that there are many aspects which play a 
role in supplier selection and many decision criteria and methods can 
be considered, whilst the effects of these methods are not always 
known. As a result, many organisations, especially those in the public 
sector, when trying to identify an Economically Most Advantageous 
Tender (EMAT), struggle with the pressure to explain their supplier 
selection choices (De Boer et al., 2006). Therefore, we argue that it is 
important to gain a deeper understanding of the practical features and 
dynamics of commonly used supplier selection methods. 
Using mathematical proofs, our research objective is to determine the 
scope of a number of problems arising with commonly used supplier 
selection methods in the public sector to identify an EMAT. In 
particular, we explore when and what can happen if decision criteria 
and their weights are published, but other parameters of the awarding 
mechanism – that are not mentioned in the EU directives – are not 
published in an RfP. Under a rather mild assumption, we prove that 
every supplier in a tender can win if specific details of the awarding 
mechanism can be determined after the fact. We also prove that it is 
theoretically optimal for the buyer to fully disclose all details of the 
awarding mechanism to suppliers.  
This paper makes a novel contribution in two ways. First, our paper 
extends beyond the existing literature by providing formal 
mathematical proofs of the problems that may occur in applying 
common supplier selection methods. In addition, we show what the 
effects of full transparency can be. Based on our first contribution, 
we also provide insights for procurement practitioners, both public 
and otherwise, seeking to apply a supplier selection method. 
This paper is organised in the following way. First, we use a practical 
example to introduce our main research question. Second, we provide 
our main analysis and proofs on how we can make any supplier win a 
tender. Next, we show and analyse some extensions and practical 
implications of our proofs. The last sections discuss the limitations of 
our analysis and provide some conclusions. 
 
A SUPPLIER SELECTION CASE 
We introduce our supplier selection model using a simple example. 
In this example, there are two decision criteria, namely price (pi for 
each supplier i) and quality (qi for each supplier i). In our example, 
we measure quality in delivery time. Weights wj for each criterion j 
are chosen to reflect the relative importance of the criteria. Here, 
quality is considered to be more important than price. Accordingly, 
the details of the awarding mechanism are published in an RfP as 
shown in Table 1.  
Description Price  Quality (delivery time)  
 Weights   40% 60% 
Table 1: A supplier selection example 
 In this paper, we consider the well-known and widely used 
Weighted Factor Score (WFS) method as a supplier selection method. 
In WFS, all suppliers are awarded scores on all criteria. These scores 
are multiplied (weighted) with the respective weights of the criteria 
and for each supplier i the total score is defined as WFSi. The 
supplier with the highest total score is awarded the contract. In the 
RfP in the example, it is published that WFS is used as a selection 
method, but the scoring methods are not published. 
In Table 2, the details of the supplier bids are given.  
Supplier i 
(weights wj) 
Price pi 
 (40%) 
Quality (delivery time) qi  
(60%) 
Supplier 1 €4,200 18 weeks 
Supplier 2 €4,500 15 weeks 
Supplier 3 €4,750 13 weeks 
Table 2: A supplier selection example with supplier data 
 The scores on the criteria can be calculated by the buyer through 
various scoring methods. We classify these methods under absolute 
(i.e., independent) and relative (i.e., interdependent) methods. The 
calculations under relative methods depend on the best, worst, and/or 
average supplier bids, while the calculations under absolute methods 
are independent of the other supplier bids.  
Both absolute and relative scores can be detailed in various ways. For 
example, the parameters used in their formula may be chosen by the 
buyer as well as the form of the graphs involved: linear or curved 
(and of course, also what kind of curvature). 
In our example, the weighted scores on price range from 0 to 40 
points. Below, we give a few examples of formula to calculate the 
scores: 
• An absolute linear score: ( ) ii ppAL ⋅−= 002.040  
• An absolute curved score: ( )
000,5
000,540 ii
ppAC −⋅=  
• A relative linear score: ( ) { } ii pppppRL ⋅−= 321 ,,min
3575  
• A relative curved score: ( ) { }
i
i p
ppppRC 321 ,,min40 ⋅=  
The scores on quality range from 0 to 60 points. To simplify our 
example, we calculate the quality scores with the absolute linear 
scoring method ( ) ii qqAL ⋅−= 160 . This method leads to the quality 
scores 42, 45, and 47 for suppliers 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The price 
scoring methods above lead to the price scores and total WFS scores 
(price scores + quality scores) as shown in Table 3. It is clear from 
the table that a different scoring method may lead to a different 
winner. 
Supplier ALi(p) WFSi ACi(p) WFSi RLi(p) WFSi RCi(p) WFSi 
1 31.6 73.6 16.0 58.0 40.0 82.0 40.0 82.0 
2 31.0 76.0 12.6 57.6 37.5 82.5 37.3 82.3 
3 30.5 77.5 8.9 55.9 35.4 82.4 35.4 82.4 
Table 3: Price scores and total scores for the supplier selection example 
(winning total scores are indicated in bold) 
This simple example leads to our main research question: (how) can 
any supplier win by judiciously managing certain details – such as 
the gradient of a price scoring method – of the awarding mechanism?  
In our analysis in the next section, we make the following basic 
assumption.  
Assumption 1. We assume that there is no convex dominance.  
This assumption implies that no bid is dominated on all criteria by a 
convex combination of the other bids. Among other things, this also 
implies that no bid is the best bid on all criteria. 
 
RESULTS 
In this section, we state several theorems and illustrate them using 
our supplier selection example. The proofs of the theorems can be 
found in the appendix to this paper. Our first theorem is a necessary 
theorem for the next theorems. It is defined as follows.  
Theorem 1. In the WFS, weights do not play a role in the 
comparison of total scores.  
While the formal proof of this theorem is in the appendix, its validity 
is easily understood by recognising that the weights of the criteria are 
always multiplied by the scores and consequently by the scale of the 
scoring methods. 
Our second theorem builds on the first one. It defines and quantifies a 
problem that may arise when a buyer tries to identify an EMAT and 
has the intention of influencing the outcome of the tender. If the 
buyer does not publish certain scoring method information in an RfP, 
he can determine a scoring method – after receiving all the bids – 
such that the supplier of his choice wins the tender.  
Theorem 2. Under our assumption, we can make any supplier in a 
public tender win by a judicious choice of the gradient g of an 
absolute scoring method.  
In our example, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that if the buyer wants 
supplier 1 to score higher than supplier 2, he can do so by choosing 
the gradient of the price scoring method. Using our proofs, supplier 1 
wins if 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg −
−⋅> . For our example,  
200,4500,4
151811 −
−⋅>g . 
So, for instance, if 0.011 >g  in ( ) ii pgpAL ⋅−= 140  or in ( ) ii pgpAL ⋅−= 1400 , then supplier 1 has a higher total score than 
supplier 2.  
While Theorem 2 applies to absolute scoring methods, we have a 
similar Theorem 3 that applies to relative scoring methods.  
Theorem 3. Under our assumption, we can make any supplier in a 
public tender win by a judicious choice of the gradient g of a relative 
scoring method.  
In our example, Theorem 3 means for instance that if the buyer wants 
supplier 1 to score higher than supplier 2, he can do so by choosing 
the right gradient of the price scoring method such that  
{ } { } 12
21
21
2
21
1
,min,min pp
qq
qq
s
pp
s
−
−⋅> . For our example, 
200,4500,4
15181
200,4
1
−
−⋅>s . So, for instance, if 241 >g  in 
( ) ii pggpRL ⋅−−= 200,440 11  or in ( ) ii p
ggpRL ⋅−−=
200,4
400 11 , 
then supplier 1 has a higher total score than supplier 2.  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
One obvious way to avoid the situation where a buyer judiciously 
chooses the parameters of a scoring method to allow his favourite 
supplier to win, is to publish these details in advance in an RfP. This 
is an adequate measure in case of absolute scoring methods. However, 
in the case of relative scoring methods this is not adequate, as the 
suppliers have another possibility to influence the outcome of the 
supplier selection process: asking other suppliers (possibly in 
exchange for something else) to submit an additional bid. This is 
usually termed “bid rigging”. 
In our example, if the complete relative scoring method is published 
in the RfP, supplier 1 could use this knowledge to its advantage by 
inviting another supplier to submit a bid with a very low price even 
though that supplier may have dismal quality. This fourth supplier 
should submit a bid such that 
200,4500,4
1518135
4 −
−⋅>
p
 that we rewrite 
as 01.035
4
>
p
 and as 500,34 <p . Thus, if the price of supplier 4 is 
less than 3,500, supplier 1 wins the tender in stead of supplier 2. Note 
that this is just one disadvantage of using relative scoring methods. 
For more disadvantages of such methods, we refer to De Boer et al. 
(2006) and Albano et al. (2008).  
The explanations of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 already show that there are 
disadvantages connected to not publishing all details of the awarding 
mechanism to suppliers. First, the buyer can influence which supplier 
wins. Second, when a relative scoring method is used, even the 
supplier can influence which supplier wins. But there is another and 
possibly even more important practical implication of these 
theorems:  
Theorem 4. It is optimal for the buyer to fully disclose all details of 
the awarding mechanism to suppliers. 
The validity of this theorem is easily understood by recognising that 
it is not only the buyer that faces choices in the supplier selection 
process. The suppliers also face choices in preparing their bids. For 
instance, they must choose whether or not to work overtime and 
deliver faster at a higher price or they can promise longer guarantee 
periods at a higher price, et cetera. So, the suppliers have a bid 
selection problem before they submit their bids. If the gradient of the 
scoring method is not published or if a relative scoring method is 
used, then the supplier does not know how many points he will score 
on the criteria. So actually, he does not know what the buyer prefers. 
The supplier has to make an educated guess when selecting his bid. 
One could state that score uncertainty leads to better bids from 
suppliers. However, we argue it is not the uncertainty of the scores, 
but the (potential) presence of competition that stimulates suppliers 
to offer a competitive bid. If the buyer does publish all details, a 
rational supplier can and will use this knowledge to optimise his total 
score and this can only lead to bids that better fit the needs of the 
buyer (as the bids score higher). The supplier still has to deal with 
competition, but if the supplier can offer two different bids that make 
the same profit, he will submit the bid that leads to the highest total 
score. Interestingly, our results are confirmed by a recent empirical 
study by Albano et al. (2008). Their results show that absolute 
scoring methods lead to better price-quality ratios than relative 
scoring methods. 
Note that it is only possible to publish all details of the scoring 
method when an absolute scoring method is used. Relative scoring 
methods can be published as abstract formula, but a supplier can 
never calculate the scores as they depend on other bids coming in as 
well. Relative scoring methods will never guarantee to fit the 
preferences of the buyer, as their exact form and position depends on 
the bids coming in. As such, relative scoring methods replace the 
preferences of a buyer to a certain extent by a lottery, because the 
lowest price is determined by the market and not by the buyer. Only 
absolute scoring methods can be used to accurately represent the 
value functions of the buyer, as the buyer can indicate what he 
believes to be a good price and quality.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
Our assumption on the absence of convex dominance is rather mild 
as the presence of convex dominance basically implies that there is 
always a combination of other bids that dominates the dominated bid. 
This assumption is necessary to prove the theorems for the linear 
scoring functions. We do believe however that there will be non-
linear scoring methods (both absolute and relative) that do not need 
this assumption to obtain the same results. We expect the general 
form of these methods to depend on the bids involved.  
Our results apply to all supplier selection methods that use a 
weighted factor score. This means that besides the Weighted Factor 
Score method, our results also apply to common methods such as the 
Canadian method (De Boer et al., 2006), the Lowest Acceptable 
Price method (De Boer et al., 2006), and the Lowest Corrected Price 
method (Dreschler, 2009). All these methods can be used for 
multiple quantitative and/or qualitative criteria tenders. However, our 
results may not apply to other methods, such as Outranking, or Value 
for Money.  
CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that the Weighted Factor Score supplier selection 
method is very sensitive to scoring methods. If certain parameters are 
not published in an RfP, an informed buyer can make almost any 
supplier win the tender by judiciously choosing some scoring method 
details. Therefore, it is wise to be completely transparent and publish 
full details of the scoring methods in the RfP. Not only does it 
prevent fraud, but we also prove that it yields better bids for the 
buying organisation. 
Also, we conclude that relative scoring methods are susceptible to 
some kind of influencing by supplier bidding strategies. Specifically, 
it turns out that some commonly used scoring mechanisms may have 
detrimental effects on almost all methods in the sense that they might 
yield rank reversal. We have provided mathematical proofs of the 
possibility of rank reversal. 
The EU directives do not explicitly state that tendering organisations 
should publish the scoring method used to calculate a score for a 
decision criterion. Based on our findings, we recommend adjusting 
the EU regulations to incorporate the requirement to publish all 
details of the scoring methods to be used. 
A thorough understanding of the phenomena studied in this paper 
might prevent the observed problems from occurring. The insights 
gained through this analysis may help procurement practitioners, 
both public and otherwise, select the right supplier selection method 
and apply them in such a way that the supplier selection method itself 
does not lead to problems and discussions. 
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APPENDIX 
We define: 
• α  as the vector containing the price and delivery time of the 
winning bid; 
• Α  as the vector containing the total score of the winning bid; 
• β  as the vector containing the prices and delivery times of the 
other bids; 
• Β  as the vector containing the total scores of the other bids. 
Assumption 1. αλβ <⋅  and 1=⋅eλ  for each λ .  
Proof of Theorem 1. If we assume there are two criteria (i.e., price 
and quality) that are scored with an absolute linear scoring method, 
then the total score for each supplier i is 
iii qgwpgwWFS ⋅−+⋅−= 2211 . As our goal is to find out whether 
and when each supplier in a public tender can win, we need to 
compare the total scores of all suppliers to each other. If there are two 
suppliers and we want the first supplier to win, then 21 WFSWFS > . 
We can rewrite this as >⋅−+⋅− 122111 qgwpgw  
222211 qgwpgw ⋅−+⋅− , as 22211211 qgpgqgpg ⋅−⋅−>⋅−⋅− , as 
( ) ( )212121 qqgppg −⋅>−⋅ , and as 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg −
−⋅> . A similar line 
of reasoning can be applied to tenders with three or more criteria 
and/or three or more suppliers, because in all cases, the weights 
cancel each other out. Thus, the weights of the criteria do not play a 
role. □ 
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove Theorem 2 using a proof by 
contradiction. As absolute linear scoring methods are a subset of 
absolute curved scoring methods, we prove by contradiction that 
Theorem 2 is correct for absolute linear scoring methods. By doing 
so, we also prove by contradiction that the theorem is correct for 
absolute curved scoring methods. We start our proof as follows. As 
weights are irrelevant, we assume them to equal 0 and leave them out 
of our equations. Given our definitions for Α  and Β  we have 
Β=⋅ βg  and Α=⋅αg . Now, α  does not win if there is an λ  for 
which Α≥⋅Β λ . We can rewrite this as ( ) αλβ ⋅≥⋅⋅ gg  and as 
αλβ ≥⋅ . This is in contradiction with Assumption 1 which that 
αλβ <⋅  and 1=⋅eλ  for each λ . □  
Proof of Theorem 3. Similar to an absolute linear scoring method, a 
relative linear scoring method is of the form ipba ⋅− . Following a 
similar line of reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1, the variable a 
does not play a role. After all, using g as the gradient, we write 
{ } { } { }⋅−−>⋅−−+⋅−− 21
1
111
21
2
221
21
1
11 ,min,min,min pp
ggwq
qq
ggwp
pp
ggw
{ } 221
2
222 ,min
q
qq
ggwp ⋅−−+  and rewrite this as 
{ } { } { } { } 221
2
2
21
1
1
21
2
1
21
1
,min,min,min,min
q
qq
gp
pp
gq
qq
gp
pp
g ⋅−⋅−>⋅−⋅− . We 
can rewrite this as { } ( ) { } ( )2121
2
12
21
1
,min,min
qq
qq
gpp
pp
g −⋅>−⋅ , as 
{ } { } 12
21
21
2
21
1
,min,min pp
qq
qq
g
pp
g
−
−⋅> , and as 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg −
−⋅> . Now, 
we can use the same proof as we used for Theorem 2 to prove 
Theorem 3. □ 
Proof of Theorem 4. For each profit level c, supplier i can choose a 
combination of bids on the criteria price pi and quality qi. If supplier i 
does not know the gradient g of the scoring method or if a relative 
scoring method is used, then supplier i has to make an educated guess 
when choosing values for pi and qi. If a rational supplier i knows the 
gradient of the scoring method, then he will choose ipˆ  and iqˆ  in 
such a way that it maximizes his total score. So,  in general ( ) ( ) iqpWFSqpWFS iiii ∀>  ,ˆ,ˆ . For each profit level c, all rational 
suppliers will act in a similar way. So, a winning supplier k has ( ) ( ) iqpWFSqpWFS iikk ∀>  ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ  and ( ) ( ) kiqpWFSqpWFS iikk ≠∀>  ,ˆ,ˆ . 
This means by definition that ( ) ( ) kqpWFSqpWFS kkkk ∀>  ,ˆ,ˆ . As the 
buyer uses the same WFS scoring method, the buyer will receive the 
best possible bid. □ 
